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Abstract. The products of systems cannot always be judged at face
value: the process by which they were obtained is also important. For
instance, the rigour of a scientic experiment, the ethics with which an
item was manufactured and the use of services with particular licens-
ing all aect how the results of those processes are valued. However,
in systems of autonomous agents, and particularly those with multiple
independent contributory organisations, the ability of agents to choose
how their goals or responsibilities are achieved can hide such process
qualities from users. The issue of ensuring that users are able to check
these process qualities is a software engineering one: the developer must
decide to ensure that adequate data is recorded regarding processes and
safeguards implemented to ensure accuracy. In this paper, we describe
AgentPrIMe, an adjunct to existing agent-oriented methodologies that
allows system designs to be adapted to give users condence in the results
they produce. It does this by adaptations to the design for documenta-
tion, corroboration, independent storage and accountability.
1 Introduction
Agent-based systems have particular qualities that require their activity to be
justied to their users. First, since they are based on autonomous components,
decisions that make use of expert knowledge or have signicant consequences
can be handled by software, and so the decisions made by such software must be
seen to be reliable if the software is to be widely adopted. In addition, by having
multiple, distributed points of control, an application may rely on services not
under the authority of the user, and whose side-eects may not be apparent to
the user: a user may wish to know that the services do not produce their results
in an undesirable way, such as being illegal, unethical, etc. Finally, in systems
where agents represent localised concerns of distributed users, it is important
to know that agents have not released private information more widely than
desired.
At some level, this problem has been well researched. There are already ap-
proaches to formally specify a multi-agent system, enabling developers to verify
its desirable properties [9]. However, this does not in itself inform developers
about what factors need to be considered, nor is it (commercially) realistic to
assume ne-grained knowledge of third-party services used in an application.Mechanisms have been designed to guide agent behaviour towards reliable re-
sults or to constrain agent behaviour to only desirable results, including con-
tracts, norms, protocols, trust evaluations etc.
Nevertheless, we argue that, even with this breadth of benecial technology,
there are signicant outstanding issues. First, agent-based systems must be de-
signed not just to be reliable but to make their reliability apparent to users if
they are to have condence in the system. Second, the above mechanisms con-
centrate on the value or otherwise of results or the cost of achieving those results,
both aspects of the system that can be immediately judged by the user or an
agent acting on their behalf. Because of this emphasis, other, hidden but still im-
portant, aspects are ignored. In particular, the mechanisms do not address how
to determine process qualities that are not immediately apparent in the result
returned by an agent but have an impact on its worth. Examples of important
process qualities occur in many domains, such as the following.
{ The rigour of the scientic experiment that produced some result.
{ The ethics (fair trade, environmental impact, etc.) of the process that led to
the sale of an item.
{ The use of services with licenses that make a result unpatentable.
{ The actual inter-dependence of two apparently independent recommenda-
tions.
The qualities of the process that led to a result are all evident in the prove-
nance of that result, i.e. everything that caused the result to be as it is. For
the provenance of a result, and process qualities evident from it, to be made
apparent to a user requires that an agent-based system be engineered to record
adequate information to determine both (1) what has occurred in the system
prior to the result being produced, and (2) which of those events are causally
related to the eventual result.
However, in a system of exible autonomous agents, such agents may lie or
collude to hide the actions they have taken where it is in their interests to do
so (as is true in the four process examples above). Similarly, without speci-
cally designing a system that prevents agents' inaccuracy, a user can be misled.
Therefore, we argue that agent-oriented designs must be specically adapted to
mitigate for inaccuracy and provide condence that users can determine exactly
how a multi-agent system came to produce a result.
In this paper, we describe AgentPrIMe, an additional stage for existing
methodologies. It is used, rstly, for determining what information needs record-
ing and how to adapt the relevant agents to do so. Then, it tackles what must be
established of an agent owned by a third-party in order to rely on it to provide
compatible and veriable information regarding provenance.
2 AgentPrIMe
A methodology fragment [8] is a software engineering procedure that is used in
addition to the usual stages of a methodology when designing an application. Itaims to add or ensure some functionality of the system, that may otherwise not
be guaranteed by the original methodology. Aspect-oriented software engineer-
ing [6] provides an example of methodology adjuncts that provide functionality
pervading across a design (usually object-oriented). Others have applied aspect-
orientation to agent-based systems [3], but we do not use the aspect concept here
because, while it is not entirely inappropriate, it carries connotations of cutting
across agents in a way that pre-supposes that the process they are involved in
is xed at design-time. Process qualities are concerned with processes that have
already occurred in a system that may be exible, open and unreliable.
A desirable quality of a methodology adjunct is methodology-neutrality, mean-
ing that it is general and suciently well-dened to be applied as part of as many
methodologies as possible. This is a distinct quality from the comparable require-
ment of methodologies (and their adjuncts) of being widely applicable to a range
of applications.
AgentPrIMe is a methodology adjunct for agent-oriented software engineer-
ing methodologies. We will refer to the methodology to which it is acting as an
adjunct as the extended methodology. The outcome of applying AgentPrIMe is
a set of adaptations to be applied to a system design, so that queries regard-
ing provenance can be reliably answered. It builds on an existing methodology
adjunct, Provenance Incorporation Methodology (PrIMe), described elsewhere
[11], which is concerned with adapting software to help users determine prove-
nance of results, but considers only service-oriented systems. In particular, PrIMe
does not address issues relevant to an agent-oriented design, where autonomous
components choose their own methods to achieve their goals and so may be
dishonest.
There are two aims of AgentPrIMe: (1) to make the provenance of results
available to users of the system, and (2) to ensure that, as far as possible,
the provenance is accurate even when agents in the system may be unreliable.
Specically, AgentPrIMe has two phases, described in detail in the following
sections.
{ Identify the causes of agent actions in the design, instances of which are
recorded as the agents act. This phase results in adaptations to agents so
that they record such causes for users to later query.
{ Identify where additional guarantees of accuracy are required, so as to be
able to rely on what agents have recorded. This phase results in adaptations
to the interactions between agents, so that users can have more condence
that what agents have recorded is accurate.
AgentPrIMe relies on understanding the types of agents that will exist within
a system, so that their eects in processes and the interactions possible between
those agents can be understood. It can aect both how those agents are ulti-
mately implemented, and may alter the possible interactions between them, as
will be seen in the subsequent sections. These dependencies mean that Agent-
PrIMe is ideally applied at a particular point in the extended methodology, when
the design is suciently well developed to adapt but not so far developed thateort is wasted. To be more concrete, we specify below at which point Agent-
PrIMe would apply when using various methodologies that the reader may be
familiar with.
{ In Gaia [14], AgentPrIMe must be applied after the agent model and ac-
quaintance model have been completed. This is because it applies to agent
types, where the functionality of an agent of each type is well-dened, and
the interactions between them dictated by the acquaintance model.
{ In MaSE [2], AgentPrIMe must be applied after the agent classes and con-
versations have been created, for analogous reasons to those given for Gaia.
{ In Prometheus [13], AgentPrIMe operates on the agent overview, after the
architecture design and before the detailed design.
{ In SODA [12], AgentPrIMe requires the data from the interaction and agent
models, so applies after SODA has completed.
3 Causality in Multi-Agent Systems
In this section, we describe the rst phase of AgentPrIMe, where system de-
signs are adapted to document the causal relationships between agent actions.
This gives users the facilities to determine the provenance of agent actions and
outputs. We consider the unreliability of agents in the next section.
3.1 Causality within Agents
A key part of AgentPrIMe is to allow agents to document the causes of their
actions, so that this information can later be used to determine what occurred in
a process. The possible causes in a model depend on the extended methodology,
but we discuss some examples in this section and then show how these can be
generalised in a well-dened way for methodology-neutrality.
Fig.1. Potential causes of an agent's actions (left) can be made explicit and recorded
(right)A variety of factors inuence an agent's behaviour at a given instant, as
illustrated in the examples summarised in Figure 1 (left). Here, we are concerned
with behaviour that aects the environment, i.e. actions, shown as the output of
the agent. Depending on the agent model used by the extended methodology, the
inuencing factors can include the agent's goals, responsibilities or rights. Often,
the latter factors are due to the roles that the agent is playing within a system
at that instant, with the goals and responsibilities having been allocated to the
roles in applying the extended methodology [7]. Additionally, triggers from the
environment, which include messages from other agents, shown as input in the
gure, inuence how an agent acts.
AgentPrIMe, and its supporting technologies, allow an agent to assert the
causal relationship between two occurrences. These assertions, called relationship
p-assertions, can be stored for later interrogation by a user, as discussed further
below. Applied to an agent design, this means that relationships can be asserted
between an output (the eect) and the inputs, goals, responsibilities, and so on
that caused it to take place. These relationships are depicted in Figure 1 (right).
Using the examples already described, these causal relationships can be used to
assert:
{ that an output message was sent in response to an input message;
{ that an action was taken to attempt to full a goal;
{ that an action was taken because it was part of the reponsibilities of the
agent; or
{ that an action was taken because it was allowed for by a right of the agent.
In recent work [10], we have discussed one particular example of this: how the
documentation of the causal eects of goals can be used to make applications
more robust.
However, the concepts described above are only a subset of those used in
agent-oriented methodologies. Others include motivations, beliefs, intentions, ad-
herence to protocols and so on, and many of these may be asserted as causes
of an agent's action. In order for AgentPrIMe to be methodology-neutral, we
need a general denition of whether something specied as part of applying a
methodology is a causal relationship, and adopt the following denition derived
from work in the philoshopy of mind [5].
E was caused by C, if E would not have occurred without C not having
occurred, all else being equal.
By applying this denition, we can determine whether a particular factor inu-
enced an action regardless of the methodology extended. For example, we can
say that a particular action would not have been taken if the agent didn't have
a responsibility to do so, or that an action would not have occurred (because it
could not) if the agent did not have the right to do so. The important quality
of this denition is that it is system independent, relying only on a notion of
occurrence.3.2 Causality between Agents
One of the causes of an agent's actions discussed above is a message received
from another agent. This is of particular interest when examining process quali-
ties: it is not the actions of a single agent that matter but of a set of agents that
ultimately produce some result. Therefore, in addition to asserting causal rela-
tionships, AgentPrIMe allows agents to assert the inputs it receives and outputs
it sends to other agents. These assertions are called interaction p-assertions, and,
along with relationship p-asssertions, connect together the actions of one agent
to those of another.
Fig.2. A chain of interactions and causal relationships between agents
A chain of two agents is shown in Figure 2. In this gure, Agent 1 sends a
message to Agent 2. This behaviour by Agent 1 is caused by the factors discussed
in the previous section, possibly including communications from other agents.
Agent 2 may act on the basis of receiving the message, possibly sending messages
to other agents. Thus, an adequate collection of interaction and relationship p-
assertions provides a connected trail of the process that led to a result. From
the result, R, shown in the gure we can follow the causal relationships and
interactions back to determine all the factors that ultimately caused it to be
as it is. Note that here, we are describing the actual interactions that an agent
engages in at run time. How to design agent interactions to best meet system
requirements has been addressed by others [1].
3.3 The Wrapper Adaptation
The p-assertions described above must be recorded in repositories so that users
can later query them. We call such repositories provenance stores. Such recording
of interaction and relationship p-assertions can be realised in a system by apply-
ing a wrapper to each agent that is doing the recording, as shown in Figure 3.
As messages come into or leave an agent, the wrapper records interaction p-
assertions regarding their content, and relationship p-assertions regarding their
causes.
3.4 Provenance
An important part of our approach is to use a common, open data model for
p-assertions. This means that all agents can independently and autonomouslyFig.3. Wrappers are adaptations to agents that automatically document incoming and
outgoing messages, and causal relationships, and send them to a provenance store
record documentation of their activities in the same format, and a user can
examine and interpret this documentation without relying on implementation
details of those agents. The full data model is documented elsewhere [4].
By examining the provenance of a result, we can therefore determine the
procedure that was followed to produce it. In theory, this would allow us to check
such process qualities as the rigour of a scientic result, or whether businesses
with dubious ethical records were used in manufacturing a good. However, doing
so depends on the agents involved in a process accurately documenting what they
do, an unreasonable assumption in many domains. In the following section, we
show how AgentPrIMe tackles the problem of potentially dishonest agents.
4 Designing for Accuracy
In this section, we discuss the ways in which agents' inaccuracy can obscure
process qualities, and how AgentPrIMe mitigates these problems through third-
party storage, accountability and corrobration. It should be emphasised that these
solutions do not guarantee accurate, honest documentation, but merely reduce
the possibilities for deception.
4.1 Design Levels
Mitigating for inaccuracy can be expensive, and not every application of Agent-
PrIMe needs to incur all of this expense. For instance, a multi-agent system maybe completely trusted not to maliciously produce incorrect assertions, e.g. if all
agents are owned by a single trusted organisation, but still may do so through
error. It is important, therefore, that AgentPrIMe allows developers to apply the
degree of mitigation they consider most appropriate for a given application.
We classify types of application, and the design requirements due to them,
into three levels, increasing in development cost. A reliable system is one in which
the agents are assumed always to record complete and accurate documentation,
or at least suciently complete and accurate that any mitigation would be more
costly than it is worth. A transparent system is one in which the agents cannot
always be trusted to assert correct information but for which there exist ways
to corroborate what they have asserted. An exploitable system is one in which
some agents are free to withold information about their activities or give false
information without being detectable. The latter two types of system will be
characterised more concretely in the following section.
It is important to note that the systems that need to be adapted to mitigate
inaccuracy are exactly those systems that users may suspect of recording inac-
curate documentation. The incentive for the designers of such systems to apply
the adaptations is that users can check whether they have been applied and will
trust the results produced by such systems on that basis. That is, regardless of
whether a system is reliable or not, a user can choose to trust results from that
system only if it is both (i) clear from a result's provenance that it was produced
in a legitimate way, and (ii) clear from the provenance and other system com-
ponents described below that the designs were adequate to prevent inaccuracy.
AgentPrIMe, therefore, provides benets to two parties:
{ for the user, it provides a way to check that adequate safeguards were in
place to ensure the provenance is reliable; and
{ for the system designer, it provides a way to give the necessary guarantees
of accuracy to a user.
4.2 Corroboration
We now characterise the dierence between transparent and exploitable unreli-
able systems, and show how AgentPrIMe requires more adaptations to be applied
to the latter.
Returning to the causal chain shown in Figure 2, we note that for every
message in the system, two agents are involved: the sender and the receiver. If
both agents record interaction p-assertions documenting the fact and content
of the message they sent/received, then one agent's assertion can be used to
verify the correctness of the other's assertion. We say that each agent's view of
the interaction provides corroboration of the other view. Therefore, where an
interaction involves one reliable agent and one unreliable agent, the latter's view
of what occurred can be checked. Note, that this cannot apply to the internal
causal relationships: only an agent knows whether its actions were caused by a
particular goal, responsibility etc. We argue that the actions that are taken in
a system will tend to be more important than the intent behind them for theend user, so that the lack of ability to corroborate internal information is not
critical.
Fig.4. Multiple organisations involved in a process
The kinds of process that cause most problems are those that involve multi-
ple organisations, where each organisation owns a set of agents involved in the
process. This is problematic because one organisation can provide an honest fa-
cade for another; for example, an apparently reliable shop may use an unethical
supplier. We depict such a scenario in Figure 4, in which Agent 3 in Organisation
2 produces result R partly on the basis of the operations of Agents 1 and 2 in
Organisation 1.
Organisations provide a unit of trust: agents can be grouped into organi-
sations such that all agents in an organisation are trusted independently from
those in any other organisation. If, in the process shown in Figure 4, Organisa-
tion 1 is trusted, then the system as a whole can be said to be transparent. This
is because every agent is either trusted or, if not, every interation they have in a
process is with a trusted agent and can therefore be corroborated by examining
the p-assertions of the trusted agent.
Fig.5. Opaque organisations involve actions that cannot be veried
An alternative situation arises when Organisation 2 is trusted, but Organisa-
tion 1 is not. In this case, one of the agents' assertions cannot be corroborated.
The situation, from a user's point of view, is shown in Figure 5: only Agents
2 and 3 produce p-assertions that can be relied on. In this case, we say that
Organisation 1 is opaque because part of its process, possibly a signicant part
from the user's perspective, is not reliably documented.Fig.6. Corroborating agents can be introduced to ensure a process remains transparent
4.3 The Corroboration Adaptation
Applying AgentPrIMe to the case above causes additional agent interactions to
be introduced to the application process. As shown in Figure 6, the corroborating
agent is introduced into the process, so that instead of a direct interaction be-
tween Agents 1 and 2, this corroborating agent acts as a redirecting intermediary.
The corroborating agent must record its own documentation of its interactions,
and be trusted by a user to be of value. The agent may be part of an exist-
ing trusted organisation, such as Organisation 2, or may in a new organisation
created by the user.
4.4 The Third-Party Storage Adaptation
The second technique to mitigate inaccuracy is for agents to store documentation
in third-party provenance stores, trusted by both the system owner and the user.
These repositories should ensure immutability and longevity of the assertions
they contain. Therefore, users have assurance that if accurate data is recorded,
it cannot later be altered or deleted. Provenance stores independent from the
agents recording documentation is recommended for all types of system, even
reliable ones.
4.5 The Accountability Adaptation
The third technique is to ensure that it is possible to verify the origin of every p-
assertion recorded, i.e. which agent created it. This is important for every type
of unreliable system, including those that are unreliable through error rather
than malice, as it allows the faulty agents to be pinpointed within a system.
Accountability can be achieved by each agent applying a digital signature to
each p-assertion, with users able to validate a p-assertion's signature when they
retrieve it from a provenance store (the store may also do its own checks).
This guards against a particular type of deception that applies to both trans-
parent and exploitable systems: an agent may assert something false but attemptto make it appear that the assertion comes from another, trusted, agent. With-
out accountability, agents are free to give a completely false view of a process
without detection.
5 Applying AgentPrIMe
Applying the AgentPrIMe methodology fragment in the context of an agent-
oriented methodology requires that the developer knows both at which point to
apply it and what steps to take in doing so. With regard to the former point, we
have already said that AgentPrIMe is ideally applied at a particular point in the
extended methodology, when the design is suciently well developed to adapt,
but not so far developed that eort is wasted. In practice, given the adaptations
described above, this means the point at which (types of) agents have been
dened well enough to know the (types of) interactions they will take part in
and the causal chains their actions lead to. Depending on the methodology, some
adaptations may be best applied even later, when an agents internal structure
is dened.
Once a reasonable point in the methodology has been determined, the devel-
oper should consider each agent in turn and determine how to wrap the agent
to record p-assertions about its activity in a provenance store, preferably a third
party one. The form that such wrapping takes depends on technology: the aim
is for the agents logic to trigger the recording of p-assertions and anything that
achieves this aim is considered to be an instantiation of a wrapper adapta-
tion. Consideration of ensuring accuracy can then begin. First, where possible,
an agent should be adapted to sign its p-assertions. Second, each interaction
between agents should be considered and, where no agent would be able to
corroborate the contents of the interaction, a third party should be added and
interactions redirected through it. The choice of third party is based on the de-
velopers best guess as to what will be trusted by those others the system is likely
to interact with.
In terms of tool support, if an agents internal operations are made explicit,
for example as an architecture with plans, then it may be possible to automate
the modelling of causation in that agent.
6 Conclusions
AgentPrIMe is an extension applicable to existing agent-oriented methodologies
that gives users condence in the results produced by designed systems. Devel-
opers applying AgentPrIMe to a design must determine how that design needs to
be adapted, rstly to record adequate documentation that exposes the qualities
of the process that produced some output of the system, and then to ensure that
the documentation itself is reliable through corroboration, independent storage
and accountability of agents.
The approach aims to be as methodology-neutral as possible, being applicable
regardless of the agent-oriented concepts that have been used in designing asystem. It does this by relying only on the agents and their interactions, that
are present in any multi-agent system, and then dening the causal relationships,
which dene the processes they are involved in, in a system-independent way.
Four design adaptations are dened in this paper:
Wrapper Adaptation Adapting agents (or agents of a given type) to record
documentation on what they have done and why.
Corroboration Adaptation Adapting agent interactions that may be seen as
collusion so that an intermediary can provide collaborating evidence of the
communications.
Third-Party Storage Adaptation Providing storage of documentation that
is trusted by both recording agents and users.
Accountability Adaptation Adapting agents to sign data before recording it
for users to query.
In future work, we will investigate further uses of process documentation
recorded by multi-agent systems. For instance, it may be possible to deter-
mine whether agents have fullled their responsibilities and do not prevent other
agents exercising their rights, by examining the documentation recorded. Addi-
tionally, we will investigate how the assurances provided by our adaptations can
be integrated with the quantitative trust models prevalent in other agent-based
research to give an informative measure of reliability to users.
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